Abstract. We demonstrate that many, though not all integrity checking methods are able to tolerate inconsistency, without having been aware of it. We show that it is possible to use them to beneficial effect and without further ado, not only for preserving integrity in consistent databases, but also in databases that violate their constraints. This apparently relaxed attitude toward integrity and inconsistency stands in contrast to approaches that are much more cautious wrt the prevention, identification, removal, repair and tolerance of inconsistent data that violate integrity. We assess several well-known methods in terms of inconsistency tolerance and give examples and counter-examples thereof.
Introduction
Integrity constraints are conditions meant to always be satisfied during the lifetime of a database. They are imposed for ensuring that no data may be entered or deleted that would render the information semantically inconsistent. For instance, in a civil registry database containing information about citizens including their marital status, entering the tuple married(john, mary) will violate a constraint forbidding bigamy if the tuple married(john, susan) is already stored. Also, in the presence of this tuple, a constraint requiring an entry for each spouse of each married couple in the person table of the database will signal violation upon an attempt to delete the entry about susan.
Semantic inconsistency in databases is supposed to be prevented by methods for checking integrity constraints for satisfaction or violation. Some prominent methods in the literature are [22, 20, 25, 14, 7] . Despite the precautions taken by running integrity checking methods, data that violate integrity may sneak into the database in various ways, and usually do so in practice. For instance, the tuples married(john, mary) and married(john, emily) may both be present in the database because the second couple divorced in a foreign country which was therefore not acknowledged at home and the more recent marriage has been entered when the integrity checking module was switched off due to a migration of the database to a new machine, or the second tuple was deleted but reappeared after a faulty backup reload.
Several cautionary ways of dealing with inconsistent data have been discussed in the literature, e.g., [4, 9] . These may involve actions of identifying, undoing or repairing inconsistency. However, experience shows that, in general, there is hardly a feasible way to guarantee completely consistency all the time, and even less so in very large databases. Thus, cautious approaches to live with violated integrity constraints have been developed for database query answering. These approaches are able to compute answers to queries in inconsistent databases that are correct in all possible repaired and consistent states that would differ from the given one in some minimal way (in [2] and several works to follow).
As opposed to the cautious measures taken by various approaches to prevent, rectify or tolerate integrity violation, as mentioned above, we propose a much more relaxed manner to tolerate manifest database inconsistencies while preserving consistent cases of integrity. Surprisingly, it turns out that conventional integrity checking methods can be used for that without further ado.
An unquestioned assumption made by all methods for integrity checking in the literature so far has been that constraints are satisfied before each update. This has been deemed necessary for improving the efficiency of determining integrity satisfaction or violation after the update. For several methods, we are going to show what happens, when this assumption is abandoned. Intuitively speaking, we define an integrity checking method to be inconsistency-tolerant if it can guarantee that each instance of any satisfied constraint will remain satisfied after each update attempt, including the rejection of updates that would cause new integrity violations. Importantly, it also includes that (possibly unnoticed) instances of violated constraints may remain so after updates. We demonstrate the usefulness of our definitions by showing that several well-known approaches to database integrity can indeed afford to abandon the consistency assumption without losing their efficiency, while their applicability is vastly increased.
The main contributions of this paper are as follows. (i) We capture with a very general definition the essence of integrity checking methods and soundness and completeness thereof. (ii) We introduce the notion of inconsistency tolerance with respect to integrity checking. (iii) We prove inconsistency (in)tolerance of several well-known integrity checking methods.
After some preliminaries including an abstract definition of the soundness and completeness of integrity checking in section 2, we define and discuss inconsistency tolerance in section 3, where we also specify, independently of any method, a general sufficient condition for inconsistency tolerance. We then verify this property for several methods in section 4. More related work and concluding remarks are addressed in section 5, with an outlook on a broader notion of inconsistency tolerance. Longer proofs have been omitted due to space constraints.
A General View of Integrity Checking
Throughout we assume the usual terminological and notational conventions for relational and deductive databases, as known from the standard literature (e.g., [1] ). In particular, we refer to the notion of clause, i.e., a formula A ← L 1 ∧· · ·∧L n where A is an atom and L 1 , . . . , L n are literals, with the usual understanding of variables being implicitly universally quantified; A is called the head and L 1 ∧ · · · ∧ L n the body of the clause. If the head is missing (understood as false) the clause is called a denial. A rule is a clause whose head is intensional, and a fact is a clause whose head is extensional and ground and whose body is empty (understood as true). A database is a finite set of facts and rules.
With regard to approaches to database integrity, we refer to [22, 8, 20, 25, 7] and others as surveyed in [21] . However, the definitions we provide in the following do not rely on any concrete approach. We only point out that integrity constraints are usually conceived as closed well-formed formulae of first-order predicate calculus in the underlying language of the database. Two standard representations of integrity constraints are used in this paper: prenex normal form (where all quantifiers are outermost and all negation symbols are innermost) and denial form. An integrity theory is a finite set of integrity constraints. We write D(IC) = sat to indicate that an integrity theory IC is satisfied in a database D, and D(IC) = vio when it is violated.
Different methods employ different notions (commonly the stable models [1] or other semantic notions) to define integrity satisfaction and violation, and use different criteria to determine these properties. In fact, each method M can be identified with its criteria, which in turn can be formalized as a function that takes as input a database (i.e., a set of database facts and rules), a finite set of integrity constraints, and an update (i.e., a bipartite finite set of database clauses to be deleted and inserted, resp.), and outputs upon termination one of the values {sat, vio}. For a database D and an update U , let D U denote the updated database (D and D U are also usually referred to as the old and the new state, respectively). Thus, soundness and completeness of an integrity checking method M can be stated as follows.
Definition 1 (Integrity checking).
An integrity checking method M is sound iff, for any database D, any integrity theory IC such that D(IC) = sat and any update U , the following holds.
An integrity checking method M is complete iff, for any database D, any integrity theory IC such that D(IC) = sat and any update U , the following holds.
It is easy to see that this general definition can be applied to virtually any given concrete method of integrity checking known in the literature, as will also be discussed in the next section. For several significant classes of logic databases including relational ones, completeness has been shown to hold for the methods in [22, 20, 25, 7] and others in the respective original papers. In particular, the methods discussed here also assume each integrity constraint to be range-restricted, i.e., any variable in an integrity constraint must occur at least in a positive literal in the body. Other methods (e.g., [18, 15] ) are only shown to be sound and thus provide sufficient conditions that guarantee integrity of the updated database.
We note here that some methods conform to a so-called compiled approach, i.e., they do not take into account the input database D, but rather provide an integrity checking condition parametric wrt the database, that is calculated on the integrity theory and the update only. Such condition, referred to as simplification (in [22] ), is then checked against a specific database. , t) . The method of [22] (and virtually all methods to follow based on a compiled approach) provides the simplified formula W =← b(i, Y ) ∧ Y = t to be tested on the database whose integrity is to be checked. For any database D, the updated database D U is guaranteed to have integrity iff
The advantages of such simplifications have amply been appraised in the literature and mainly consist in major gains in efficiency (compare the complexity of W with that of W in example 1) and in the fact that they can be generated so to speak statically (without knowing the actual database, but only its integrity theory and the update), thus without burdening run time database performance with potentially heavy optimizations. One may object that the update is known only at run time, but, as recognized in later approaches (e.g., [15, 12, 7] ), simplifications can be generated for parameterized patterns of updates conceived by the database designer; when an actual update is executed, the parameters in the simplification are replaced by the actual values and tested against the database. For example, i and t in example 1 may well be considered as placeholders for actual ISBNs and titles, so when book 4 with ISBN 5 is inserted, these values should replace t and i, respectively, in W and the resulting formula be checked against the database. Among the methods based on a compiled approach, it is worthwhile to distinguish between simplifications to be checked in the new state (henceforth called post-tests and considered, e.g., in [22, 20, 12, 23, 19] ) and simplifications to be checked in the old state (studied, e.g., in [24, 7] and henceforth called pre-tests). The advantage of pre-tests is that updates are executed only if known to lead to a consistent database, whereas with a post-test, one needs to execute the update anyway, and then roll it back if the reached database is inconsistent. Definition 2. Let IC, IC be integrity theories and U an update. Consider:
IC is a plain pre-test (resp., plain post-test) if (3) (resp. (4)) holds for every database D.
The notion of plain test intuitively indicates a simplification that does not exploit satisfaction of IC in the old state. Indeed, the assumption of integrity in the old state, common to virtually all integrity checking methods, is a key factor for the generation of simplifications that are indeed easier than the original integrity constraints. Simplifications returned by actual methods are therefore expected to be at least as "good" as plain tests, which can thus be used for benchmarking purposes. Next, we show how the integrity assumption may be relaxed.
Inconsistency Tolerance of Integrity Checking
In this section we formally define the notion of inconsistency tolerance. As indicated above, the intuition of inconsistency tolerance of an approach M to integrity checking is that we want to tolerate (or, rather, be able to live with) cases of violated constraints as long as we can ensure that no new cases of integrity violation are introduced. In this way, the cases of integrity that are satisfied before the update will remain satisfied afterwards. To clarify what we mean by "case", we employ the notion of substitution, i.e., a mapping from variables to terms (for compactness, vector notation is used to indicate sequences of terms). A substitution σ may also be written as { X/ t} to indicate that the variables in X are orderly mapped to the terms in t; the notation Rng(σ) refers to the set of variables in X, Img(σ) to the set of variables in t. Whenever E is a term (resp. formula) and σ is a substitution { X/ t}, the notation Eσ denotes the term (resp. formula) that arises from E when each free occurrence of a variable in X is simultaneously replaced by the corresponding term in t; Eσ is called an instance of E. A formula or term which contains no variables is called ground. A substitution { X/ Y } is called a renaming iff Y is a permutation of X. Formulas F , G are variants of one another if F = Gρ for some renaming ρ. Furthermore, a variable x occurring in an integrity constraint W is a global variable in W if it is ∀-quantified but not dominated by any ∃ quantifier (i.e., ∃ does not occur left of the quantifier of x in W ) in the prenex normal form of W ; Glb(W ) denotes the set of global variables in W .
Clearly, each variable in a constraint W represented in denial form is a global variable of W . Note that cases of an integrity constraint need not be ground, and that each constraint W as well as each variant of W is a case of W . Inconsistency tolerance of an integrity checking method M can be defined as follows.
Definition 4 (Inconsistency tolerance
). An integrity checking method M is inconsistency-tolerant if, for any database D, any update U , any integrity theory IC, any finite set IC of cases of constraints in IC such that D(IC ) = sat, the following holds.
Note that, even though there may well be an infinity of cases of constraints in IC, the finiteness requirement for IC entails no loss of generality: (5) guarantees satisfaction of any number of cases, if M returns sat. Note that (5) is a "soundness" condition wrt. inconsistency tolerance. Its dual would define a notion of completeness wrt. inconsistency tolerance, which, however, is hopelessly complied with by any method, since a method returning sat for an empty integrity theory (which it should, as an empty theory is always satisfied), should then also return sat for any integrity theory, the empty theory being just an empty set of cases. We therefore only concentrate on soundness wrt. inconsistency tolerance. Clearly, for checking integrity with an inconsistency-tolerant method M, (5) suggests to compute the very same function as in the traditional case, where satisfaction of all of IC in D is required. Hence, with this relaxation, no efficiency is lost, whereas the gains are immense: with an inconsistency-tolerant method, it is possible to continue database operations even in the presence of (obvious or hidden, known or unknown) violations of integrity (which is rather the rule than the exception in practice), while maintaining the integrity of all cases which comply with the constraints. Whenever M is employed, no new cases of integrity violation will be introduced, while existing "bad" cases may disappear (by intention or even accidentally) by executing given updates which have passed the integrity test of M. With the strict requirement of integrity satisfaction in the old state, not the least bit of integrity violation was tolerable; hence, the results of virtually all approaches to database integrity would remain nearly useless in practice, unless they can be shown to be inconsistency-tolerant. Fortunately, most known approaches to database integrity are indeed inconsistency-tolerant. It is easily verified that a method based on a compiled approach always returning a plain test is inconsistency-tolerant. To this end, we overload our terminology by applying the notion of inconsistency tolerance to (pre-or post-) tests.
Definition 5.
A pre-test (resp., post-test) IC of an integrity theory IC for an update U is inconsistency-tolerant whenever, for any case W of a constraint in Clearly, a method M that, for any input D, IC, and U , always calculates a plain test of IC for U and then evaluates it in D is inconsistency-tolerant.
A Sufficient Condition for Proving Inconsistency Tolerance
For any given method M, it is easy to see that its inconsistency tolerance as expressed by (5) directly follows from soundness of integrity checking if condition (6) below is satisfied for each database D, each integrity theory IC, each finite set IC of cases of constraints in IC s. t. D(IC ) = sat, and each update U :
i.e., if satisfaction of M for an integrity theory entails satisfaction of M for any set of cases thereof. Hence, we immediately have the following result.
Theorem 2. Let M be a sound method for integrity checking. Then, M is inconsistency-tolerant if (6) holds.
Proof. For a database D, an update U and a finite set IC of cases of constraints in IC such that IC is satisfied in D, a special case of (1) obviously is
By transitivity between (6), which is assumed to hold, and (7) we obtain (5).
Condition (6) is verified for the approaches in [22, 20] in section 4. Such methods generate simplified forms of constraints, such that, roughly speaking, the truth value of the simplified form of any case of a constraint W is implied by the truth value of the simplified form of W itself, from which (6) follows. The condition is also verified for methods that are not based on a compiled approach, e.g., [25] . However, it would be wrong to think that inconsistency tolerance came for free with any sound approach to integrity whatsoever, and section 4 also shows examples of methods that are not inconsistency-tolerant.
Inconsistency Tolerance of Known Methods

The Method of Nicolas
We show here that the well-known simplification method for integrity checking in [22] , henceforth denoted M N , is inconsistency-tolerant. We do so by a direct generalization of the "if" half of the equivalence statement of its central theorem 1. All preparatory results in [22] straightforwardly hold also in our framework, once we assume that each integrity constraint is range-restricted and a sufficiently large underlying language which remains fixed across updates is used.
For a database D, an integrity constraint W in prenex conjunctive normal form and a tuple r to be inserted into some relational table R, Nicolas' simplification method automatically generates a simplification Γ + r,W = W γ 1 ∧ . . . ∧ W γ m , m ≥ 0, where the γ i are unifiers of r and m different occurrences of negated atoms in W that unify with r. The simplification is denoted by Γ + R in [22] ; for convenience, we make the updated tuple r and the constraint W explicit. (Symmetrically, for a tuple s to be deleted, a simplification consisting of conjuncts obtained by instantiating W with unifiers of s and non-negated occurrences of matches of s is generated; for simplicity, we only deal with the insertion theorem here; the result about deletions and its proof are completely symmetrical.)
The simplification theorem in [22] 
Proof (Theorem 3).
According to condition (6) , it suffices to show, under the premise that D U (W * ) = sat, the following.
r,W * ) = sat where Γ + r,W * is the simplification of W * for the insertion of r as generated by M N .
For each negated literal ∼r i ζ in W * such that r i ζ unifies with r, we have a fortiori that also r i unifies with r, since r i ζ is more specific than r i . In particular, we have r i ζβ i = r i γ i = r, where β i and γ i are the substitutions used to compute Γ 
The Method of Lloyd, Sonenberg and Topor
Let W = ∀W be an integrity constraint in prenex normal form and W * = ∀(W ζ) a case of W . In this section, we show that the integrity checking method by Lloyd, Sonenberg and Topor [20] , here denoted M LST , is inconsistency-tolerant. We do so by following the structure of corresponding statements of results and proofs in [20] , which actually generalize the basic result in [22] and its proof step by step. In particular, we assume that sets pos D,D and neg D,D for capturing the difference between two databases D and D such that D ⊆ D be defined precisely as in [20] . The two sets consist of atoms that either are the head of some clause in U = D \ D or the head of a database clause in D that is possibly affected by reasoning forward from clauses in U . It is easy to see by their original definition that these sets capture a superset of facts that are actually inserted (pos (D, D ) ), i.e., provable after the update but not before, or deleted (neg (D, D ) ), i.e., provable before but not after the update. Note that, due to negative literals in the body of clauses that are affeced by an update U , explicit insertions in U may lead to implicit but provable deletions, and explicit deletions in U may lead to implicit but provable insertions.
Let D be a stratified database and U an update which preserves stratification and is partitioned into a set of deletions U 1 and a set of insertions U 2 such that executing the deletions first leads to an intermediate state
we also write D as in [20] . It is shown in [20] Thus, the following rules for identifying relevant constraints that are potentially violated by an update, as established in [22] for relational databases and generalized to deductive databases in [8] , apply as follows. Only those atoms in pos(D", D ) ∪ neg(D", D) that unify with the atom of a negative literal in W by some mgu φ capture a possibly inserted fact that may violate integrity, which is then checked by evaluating W φ. And only those atoms in neg(D", D ) ∪ pos(D", D) that unify with the atom of a positive literal in W by some mgu φ capture a possibly deleted fact that may violate integrity, which is then checked by evaluating W φ . Let Φ(W ) be the set of all such substitutions φ and φ . In [20] , Φ(W ) is obtained as the union of two sets Θ and Ψ of substitutions, which both depend on W . However, this and other details in the proof of 4 in [20] , are not relevant in the proof of theorem 5 below.
We now can re-state the simplification theorem in [20] as follows. Part (a) expresses the soundness of the method M LST . Part (b) says that it can be computed with SLDNF. Thereafter, we state that M LST is inconsistency-tolerant.
Theorem 4 ([20] Lloyd et al.'s simplification theorem).
Suppose D(W ) = sat. Then we have the following:
Theorem 5 (Inconsistency tolerance of Lloyd et al.'s simplification).
Suppose D(W * ) = sat. Then the following holds.
We finally remark that inconsistency-tolerant versions of the two corollaries of theorem 4 in [20] for single clause insertions or deletions can be obtained as straightforwardly as the original results.
The Method of Sadri & Kowalski
In this subsection, we are going to verify condition (6) for the integrity checking method in [25] , henceforth referred to as M SK . We first note that none of the proofs of the theorems and corollaries in [25] effectively makes use of the assumption that integrity is satisfied in the old state, except the completeness results following from theorems numbered 4 and 5 in [25] . This already provides a certain form of tolerance of M SK with regard to integrity violation, in the following sense: whenever M SK (D, IC, U ) = vio, then the correctly indicated violation of integrity is independent of the integrity status before the update. However, rather than integrity violation, we are after inconsistency tolerance wrt. integrity satisfaction, as expressed in (5) . The independence of detecting integrity violation via M SK from the integrity status before the update is trivial, and was addressed above only to be precise about what we are dealing with. The main result of this subsection is the following. The function M SK (D, IC, U ) determines integrity violation and satisfaction by the existence or, respectively, absence of a refutation in the search space of the theorem-prover defined in [25] with an element from U as top clause. We illustrate its inconsistency tolerance by an example adapted from [17] . Example 3. Consider a database D consisting of clauses C 1 -C 5 shown in figure  1 for unary relations r (regular residence), c (citizen), d (deported) and binary relation w (works for) and the integrity constraint W , expressing that it is impossible to both have a regular residence status and be registered as a deported person at the same time. The given update U inserts a new rule asserting that people working for a registered citizen also have regular residence status. Clearly, W is not satisfied in D, since r(jo) is derivable via C 1 and C 3 , and
If W were satisfied in D, the approach of [25] would traverse the search space given by the tree shown in figure 1 (selected literals are underlined) , with U as top clause. Since this tree is finitely failed, we can conclude that U will not introduce new cases of inconsistency: all cases of integrity constraints that were satisfied in D remain satisfied in D U . In particular, W is also satisfied in D U .
The Method of Gupta et al.
As we anticipated, not all methods comply with the requirements of definition 5.
The well-known method by Gupta et al. [14] , henceforth referred to as M GSU W , is indeed not inconsistency-tolerant. The integrity constraints considered by their method are of the form
in which L is a literal referring to a local (and thus accessible) predicate, the R i 's are literals referring to remote predicates that cannot be accessed to check the integrity status of the database, while the C j 's are arithmetic comparisons such that the variables occurring in them also occur in L or one of the R i 's 1 ; an update, for M GSU W , is an insertion of a tuple in L's relation.
Their main result (theorem 5.2 in [14] ) is based on the notion of reduction of a constraint W of the form (8) : the reduction of W by tuple t inserted in L's local predicate, written RED(t, L, W ), is obtained by substituting the components of t for the corresponding variables in L, and then eliminating L. Then to check whether W is satisfied after the insertion of t, and assuming W was satisfied before the insertion, it suffices to check whether
For example, W =← l(X, Y )∧r(Z)∧X ≤ Z ≤ Y indicates that no Z in r may occur in an interval whose ends are specified by l. Suppose D = {l(3, 6), l(5, 10)} and U is the insertion of l (4, 8) ; then one concludes that D U (W ) = sat, since
which holds basically because [4, 8] ⊆ [3, 10] .
To show that here we do not have inconsistency tolerance, consider a case (3, 6) , l(5, 10), r(7)} and the same update U as before. Clearly, W is violated in D whereas W is satisfied. Again, the method guarantees that U cannot violate integrity provided that D has integrity (for the same containment as before), i.e., M GSU W (D, W, U ) = sat. However, satisfaction of W is not preserved in D U , therefore M GSU W is not inconsistency-tolerant.
The Method of Christiansen and Martinenghi
The method of [6, 7] is based on the generation of pre-tests. Given an integrity theory IC and an update U , it consists of the following two steps:
-first, a specific plain pre-test of IC for U is obtained, denoted After U (IC), as described in definition 6 below; -second, After U (IC) is reduced in size ("optimized") by removing from it all denials and literals that can be proved to be redundant in it by assuming that IC holds. The result is denoted Optimize IC (After U (IC)) and the Optimize transformation is described in definition 7.
The After operator takes as input an integrity theory and an update and is proved in [7] to return a plain pre-test thereof.
Definition 6. Let IC be an integrity theory 2 and U an update. The notation After U (IC) refers to a copy of IC in which all atoms of the form p( t) have been
= a n , where p( a 1 ), . . . , p( a n ) are all facts that U adds to p and p( b 1 ), . . . , p( b m ) are all facts that U deletes from p.
It is assumed that After U (IC) is represented as a set of denials, which can be obtained by straightforward application of De Morgan's laws. This is then optimized via a terminating proof procedure ( ) based on resolution and subsumption. We do not delve into the details here and just assume to be sound. Definition 7. Let Σ, ∆ be integrity theories; Optimize ∆ (Σ) is the result of applying on Σ the following rewrite rules as long as possible
where Σ is an integrity theory, C a conjunction of literals, L a literal, σ an integrity constraint, and a sound and terminating implementation of provability.
An application of the method, denoted here M CM (D, IC, U ), consists then of evaluating in D the expression Optimize IC (After U (IC)), which is proved in [7] to be a pre-test of IC for U . Although one can easily derive from theorem 1 that One may object that IC above had redundancies, since it is equivalent to ← t and, if it had been expressed like that, there will be no discussion about satisfaction of a case ← t ∧ q(a) ∧ r(a) simply because ← t ∧ q(a) ∧ r(a) would not have been a case. This indicates that inconsistency tolerance by case was lost because the method optimized "too much". It can be shown with a similar example that M CM is not unsatisfiability-tolerant either (indeed, IC in example 4 is unsatisfiable if t is in D). However, excessive optimizations coming from the interplay between different constraints are avoided if IC contains a single constraint (or constraints that, pairwise, have no predicate in common, which is a likely circumstance).
Theorem 7. Let IC = {W } be an integrity theory, W a denial, U an update. Then the pre-test IC of IC for U obtained by M CM is inconsistency-tolerant.
Discussion
Efficient integrity checking has been recognized by a large body of research as a fundamental database topic for more than two decades. As mentioned, methods exist in which the checking phase proper is preceded by a compilation phase that generates either a pre-test [16, 24, 7] or a post-test [22, 19] for integrity. Other methods regard integrity checking as an instance of query answering and modify the behavior of the query engine for this purpose [8, 25] . Indeed, integrity checking can be regarded as a special case of materialized view maintenance: integrity constraints are defined as views that must always remain empty for the database to be consistent [13, 10] .
Intuitively, it seems unrealistic to assume that integrity in databases is always completely satisfied. This, however, is exactly the premise for virtually all known approaches to integrity checking. The unease about this intuitive conflict has motivated our relaxation of the consistency requirement on the basis of the notion of satisfaction by "cases" of an integrity constraint.
One of the main purposes of integrity checking and enforcement is to make data comply with their semantic requirements and thus to have trustable query answers. The results shown in this paper provide us with tools that pave the way towards better data semantics: in this sense, one may "measure" the amount of inconsistency in a database, in a sense that can be defined, e.g., as in [11] , and show that such measure cannot increase as long as an inconsistency-tolerant approach is used. In turn, this guarantees, at least in a probabilistic sense, that query answers will tend to be more trustable. For example, in a relational database, the percentage of the data that participate in inconsistencies will necessarily decrease in the new state if the update consists only of insertions.
Methods based on logic programming such as [25] do not take into account irrelevant clauses for refuting denial constraints, and thus, in a procedural sense, do not show the explosive behavior predicted by first-order logic in the presence of inconsistency. However, to the best of our knowledge, the declarative inconsistency tolerance of integrity checking has never been studied nor even defined before. Yet, we reckon that all the mentioned approaches can be reconsidered in terms of this declarative understanding of inconsistency tolerance and most of them can actually be characterized as inconsistency-tolerant. We also observe that all of the performance gains obtained by such integrity checking methods are inherited by their inconsistency-tolerant counterparts, while their applicability is greatly extended. Indeed, in some contexts, certain violations of integrity constraints may be considered acceptable or even unavoidable, e.g., in distributed or federated systems or when data come from unverified sources.
We remark that the inconsistency intolerance of the methods analyzed in this paper may be understood as an indication that approaches to integrity which implement special treatment for certain cases (as M GSU W ) or that optimize beyond the scope of a single constraint (as M CM ) tend to be less inconsistencytolerant than other methods. To this end, it should be interesting to study other definitions of inconsistency tolerance that are not based on the notion of case.
The related problems of restoring integrity once inconsistencies are detected (tackled since [2] with the notion of repair ) and of using active rules for much the same purpose [4] , certainly give way to inconsistency tolerance, but cannot be directly used to detect inconsistencies for integrity checking purposes. Future work will investigate in which sense also other integrity checking methods are inconsistency-tolerant (the literature in this field is indeed immense, as witnessed by, e.g., [21] ). To this end, it will be interesting to study how the notion of inconsistency tolerance can be extended to query evaluation and how this relates to consistent query answering in inconsistent databases (e.g., [3] ). We also intend to investigate the feasibility of implementing inconsistency-tolerant integrity checking in replicated databases.
